Charitable Solicitations and the First Amendment: Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 21
January 1981
Charitable Solicitations and the First Amendment:
Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charitable Solicitations and the First Amendment: Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), 21 Urb.
L. Ann. 273 (1981)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/9
CHARITABLE SOLICITATION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG
v. CITIZENS FOR A BETTER
ENVIRONMENT(CBE)
Solicitation of funds frequently invokes the first amendment' pro-
tections for disseminating information and advocating causes.2
When it does, any governmental restrictions imposed must bear a
precise relation3 to fulfillment of a compelling state interest4 to avoid
a serious challenge to their constitutionality.' In Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE),6 the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional7 an ordinance' that barred9 so-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The social interest that the "First Amendment upholds is meaningful operation
of the political process allowing the nation to more readily adopt courses of action
that satisfy the desires of the majority." Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88
YALE LJ. 1105, 1112 n.33 (1979), quoting A. BIcKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 62
(1975).
Constitutional theorists readily admit that the first amendment bears a necessary
relationship to the democratic process. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speec.k An lnquiry into the Substance and Limits of Princile, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299,
302 (1978).
3. See G. GUNT ER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1042 (9th ed. 1975); Jones, Solicita-
tions--Charitable and Religiour, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 53 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Jones].
4. See generally, Jones, supra note 3.
5. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (no pre-
sumption of constitutionality for laws restricting first amendment freedoms).
6. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
7. The Court had statutory jurisdiction in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976).
This provision gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction in eases involving a challenge to
the validity of a state statute on the ground of its repugnancy to the Constitution. Id.
This encompasses every legislative act sanctioned by a state. Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85, construed in King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 102 (1928).
8. See SCHAUMBURO, ILL., VILLAGE CODE, ch. 22, art. 11I, § 20(g) (1974), which
required:
Satisfactory proof that at least seventy-five per cent of the proceeds of such solici-
tation will be used directly for the charitable purposes of the organization. For
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licitation by charitable organizations' ° failing to meet an arbitrary,
fixed limit on administrative expenses. The Court ruled that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally overbroad."
such purposes, the following items shall not be deemed to be used for the charita-
ble purposes of the organization:
1) Salaries or commissions paid to solicitors;
2) Administrative expenses of the organization, including, but not limited to,
salaries, attorney's fees, rents, telephone, advertising expenses, contribu-
tions to other organizations and persons, except as a charitable contribution
and related expenses incurred as administrative or overhead items.
For the purpose of satisfying the requirements of sub-paragraph (g), the
organization shall submit a certified audit of the last full year of operations,
indicating the distribution of funds collected by the organization, or such
other comparable evidence as may demonstrate the fact that at least sev-
enty-five per cent of the funds collected are utilized directly and solely for
the charitable purpose of the organization.
Id.
9. The Court emphasized the fact that the ordinance contained no provision per-
mitting an organization unable to comply with the 75% requirement, see note 8 supra,
to obtain a permit by demonstrating that its solicitation costs were justified. 444 U.S.
at 635 n.9. Moreover, because the city based compliance with the 75% requirement
upon organizations' receipts and expenses during theprevious year, there appeared to
be no way an organization could alter its spending patterns to comply with the ordi-
nance in the short run. Finally, although organizations like Citizens for a Better En-
vironment (CBE) might pay only reasonable salaries, they would still necessarily
spend more than 25% of their budgets on salaries and administrative expenses, and
would therefore be barred from solicitation in the Village. Id.
10. See note 18 infra.
11. "An overbroad statute is one that is designed to burden or punish activities
which are not constitutionally protected, but the statute includes within its scope ac-
tivities which are protected by the First Amendment." See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NowAK]; G.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1132-36 (9th ed. 1975). See, e.g., Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("substantial overbreadth"
approach).
There are three types of overbreadth statutes:
1) Remedial statutes "hamper First Amendment activities for the purpose of pro-
moting values which are within the concern of the Amendment. . . [Riemedial
laws include. . . the fairness doctrine of the broadcast media, as well as laws
regulating lobbying, campaign contributions, and union elections." The Court is
more tolerant of remedial laws than of the other two types of overbreadth stat-
utes.
2) Inhibitory laws "impinge on expressive and associational conduct but [their]
impact tends to be neutral as to viewpoints sought to be advocated.., such as
libel laws."
3) "Censorial laws seek to burden the advocacy of matters of public concern,
such as criminal syndicalism laws." The Court is least tolerant of censorial stat-
utes. NowAK, supra, at 725-26.
In Village of Schaumburg, the Court categorized the solicitation ordinance as
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Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), a nonprofit charitable
organization, distributed literature 2 and disseminated views 13 on en-
vironmental issues door-to-door 4 without invitation. 5 CBE had
asked the lower courts16 for declaratory and injunctive relief from a
censorial ("[deciding in advance] what information may be disseminated from
house to house, and who may impart the information"). 444 U.S. at 639. See
Jones, supra note 3, at 59 ("Conditions for the issuance of a permit are prime
targets for constitutional attacks based on vagueness or overbreadth.").
12. Village of Schaumburg v. CBE, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). See generally Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976). In Hynes, the Court dealt with a city ordi-
nance requiring an identification permit for canvassing from house to house for chari-
table or political purposes. The Court held that soliciting and door-to-door
canvassing were subject to reasonable regulation so as to protect citizens against crime
and undue annoyance, but that the first amendment required the regulation to be
drawn with "narrow specificity." Id. at 620. For the text of the ordinance see id. at
611-14.
13. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Court observed that freedom
of expression, if it is to fulfill its historic function in our nation, must embrace all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of
our society to cope with the exigencies of their period. Cf. Village of Schaumburg v.
CBE, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). The Court stated that the solicitation for funds is "subject
to reasonable regulation". The Court emphasized, however, that such solicitation is
often combined with information dissemination and advocacy of causes that involve
political and social matters. The Court concluded that without this solicitation the
flow of information and advocacy would probably cease. Id. at 632.
14. The landmark case of Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147
(1949), involved a canvasser for a religious society who passed out booklets door-to-
door and asked for contributions. The canvasser was arrested under an ordinance
which prohibited canvassing, soliciting, or distribution of circulars door-to-door with-
out a permit. The issuance of the permit rested in the discretion of public officials.
The town claimed that the ordinance was valid as a protection against fraudulent
solicitations and the solicitation of funds without a permit. The Supreme Court, in
reversing the judgment of the lower court, asserted that the ordinance not only ap-
plied to religious canvassers, but to anyone wishing to present his or her political,
social, or economic views. Id. at 163. Consequently, the Court held that the town
could not, in the name of preventing fraudulent appeals, subject door-to-door advo-
cacy and the communication of views to the permit requirement. Id. But cf. Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (Court upheld state prohibition of uninvited
door-to-door solicitation for magazine subscriptions, stating that it was a valid eco-
nomic due process regulation in the interest of privacy).
15. The Court has asserted that the decision whether to contribute funds to a
door-to-door solicitor should be left to the individual homeowner. E.g., Rowan v.
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 731-35 (1970) (sign could be used to keep solicitors
away). Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (state should not intrude
unnecessarily upon the first amendment rights of solicitors).
16. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which had decided this case below,
noted that three years earlier in a case also involving CBE it had recognized the
problems inherent in a flat ban "of canvassing. . . by a non-profit group. . . ex-
1981)
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municipal ordinance which imposed a fixed spending requirement on
all 17 charitable organizations soliciting on a door-to-door basis. 18
The municipality argued that it precisely drew the solicitation permit
provision to serve the compelling governmental interests of protec-
tion from fraud, 9 invasion of privacy,2" and preservation of public
safety.2 The Supreme Court disagreed,22 stating that the speech in-
terests of CBE and other charitable organizations23 received inade-
press[ing] essentially political ideas." CBE v. Village of Schaumburg, 590 F.2d 220,
225 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), quoting CBE v. City of Park Ridge,
567 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1975).
17. "Broad rules [protecting] free expression are [automatically] suspect."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
18. Specific terms in the village ordinance were defined in accordance with the
wording of the Illinois solicitation statute. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 5101(a), (e), (1)
(1976) (Smith-Hurd). The statute provides the following three relevant definitions:
a) "Charitable organization." Any benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or elee-
mosynary person or one purporting to be such which solicits and collects funds
for charitable purposes and includes each local, county, or area division within
this State of such charitable organization, ...
e) "Professional solicitor." Any person who is employed or retained for com-
pensation by a professional fund raiser to solicit contributions for charitable pur-
poses from persons in this State.
f) "Charitable purpose." Any charitable, benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or
eleemosynary purpose.
Id.
19. See Village of Schaumburg v. CBE, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980).
20. Id. at 638.
21. The Court admitted the "substantial" governmental interest in public safety,
as well as in protection against fraud and intrusions upon privacy. Id. at 636. Never-
theless, it said that "these interests. . .[were] only peripherally promoted by the 75%
spending requirement." Id. The Court concluded that the three public interests
which the municipality proferred could be served by less burdensome measures. Id.
at 636-37. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (punishing litterers rather
than handbillers considered an alternative means for preventing littering which would
constitute lesser interference with protected freedom of speech).
22. Emphasizing the unreasonableness of the fixed spending limitation, the Court
pointed out that "the costs incurred by charitable organizations" that solicit funds
door-to-door can vary greatly depending on many factors, some of which are beyond
the organizations' control. Village of Schaumburg v. CBE, 444 U.S. 620 at 637.
23. In Village of Schaumburg, the Supreme Court was not concerned with the
particular characteristics of CBE but instead with the impact of § 22-20(g), svupra note
8, on organizations of the te CBE purported to be. 444 U.S. at 627. In appraising
a statute's inhibitory effect upon first amendment rights, the Court has taken into
account possible applications of a regulation in other factual contexts besides the one
at bar. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (concern with breadth of law's
potential application).
It is well settled that an ordinance which directly implicates first amendment inter-
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quate protection 24 under the ordinance. The Court therefore held the
ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad 21 on its face26 in violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments.27
The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the principle that
the Constitution affords special protection to free speech interests.28
ests is unconstitutional if it creates even the potential for abuse in its application. See
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) ("narrow, objective,
and definite standards" required to uphold permit mechanism); Lovell v. City of Grif-
fin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-53 (1938) (ordinance prohibiting distribution of any literature
without permit held unconstitutional restraint).
24. The Court stated that a penalty or a financial disclosure requirement would
have been less intrusive ways of regulating CBE's first amendment interests. 444 U.S.
at 637-38.
25. See note 11 supra. A concept closely related to that of overbreadth is vague-
ness, which concerns precision of statutory language. Hy es v. Mayor of Oradell pro-
vides the yardstick against which precision of language in an enactment must be
measured. 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976).
26. 444 U.S. at 639. In first amendment areas involving overbreadth, a common
distinction is made between a statute that is overbroad on its face, and one that is
overbroad as applied to a particular factual situation. Comment, Constitutional
Law-The Fine Line Between Protected and Non-Protected Speech-McCall v. State,
354 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1978), 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 749, 750 (1979). This distinction is
important because a court reviews a statute challenged on facial overbreadth differ-
ently than a statute challenged for overbreadth as applied. Id. If it is not possible for
the statute to reach protected activity, the statute is facially constitutional. However,
in an overbreadth challenge to a statute as it has been applied, the facts in the record
are crucial. Id. at 751.
The Supreme Court asserted that the 75% requirement was unreasonable on its face
because it barred solicitation by a "substantial category of charities" even where the
contributions would be used to pay reasonable salaries to those who gathered and
disseminated information relevant to a "charitable purpose." Village of Schaumburg
v. CBE, 444 U.S. 620, 635-38 (1980).
27. The parties in Village of Schaumburg agreed that the only issue was the con-
stitutional status of the spending regulation. 444 U.S. 620, 628, 633 (1980). Conse-
quently, the Village would have no discretion to refuse issuance of a permit to CBE if
the Court ruled in favor of CBE on this legal issue.
28. Freedom of speech holds a preferred status in the order of American liberties
and, as one of the first amendment freedoms, is protected from even the subtlest gov-
ernmental interference. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1976) (political con-
tribution and expenditure limitations within fundamental first amendment activities
because discussion of public issues integral to operation of representative democracy);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (freedom to state views and advocate
causes necessary for informed public discussion of labor issues); Jones, supra note 3,
at 53-54 (courts regard first amendment rights as fundamental to a free society; conse-
quently, they place them in a preferred position); Leventhal, Courts and Political
Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 361 (1977) (in area of basic freedoms, Court has
developed an array of importance). The theory underlying the principle that the
Constitution affords special protection to certain private interests "is that in American
19811
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One specially protected free speech interest is the right to engage in
conduct for the communication of opinions and ideas.29 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court has applied strict standards 30 to statutes
regulating and restraining conduct that involves such interests as
political3" and religious expression. 32 In contrast, the Court until re-
cently did not show solicitude for purely commercial interests. 33 Be-
society some individual interests have greater value than others and thus are entitled
to special judicial protection." Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling. The
Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. Rav. 462 (1977).
The Court has noted that acceptable justifications for regulation of the freedom of
speech include considerations of the time, place, and manner of a proposed activity so
as to insure order and convenience between competing interests. Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939). The Court added, however, that such restraints have been upheld
only in cases where strict procedural safeguards exist to counter the encroachment on
first amendment freedom. Id. at 516-17. See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51 (1964), where the Court set forth procedural safeguards applicable to all licensing
laws affecting first amendment rights. One of these procedural rules was a guarantee
of prompt final judicial decision. Id. at 58-59. In subsequent federal litigation, a
district court implied that what might otherwise be an unconstitutionally overbroad
legislative scheme can be saved by a provision guaranteeing a prompt judicial resolu-
tion. ISKCON v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
29. See Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939).
30. See note 3 supra.
31. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). The Court in Thomas rea-
soned that the solicitation of labor union memberships was so intertwined with speech
that a prior permit could not be required. Id. at 532. Moreover, the Court stated that
a governmental body could only regulate the "collection of funds" in such a manner
as not to intrude upon the rights of free speech and free assembly. Id. at 541.
32. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940). This case involved a statute
forbidding the solicitation of contributions of anything of value by religious, charita-
ble, or philanthropic causes without obtaining official approval. The state prosecuted
three members of a religious group for selling books, distributing pamphlets, and
soliciting contributions or donations. The Court overturned the state court convic-
tions, holding that the state regulation which gave broad licensing discretion to desig-
nated officials was an invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Id. at
307.
33. The Court long distinguished speech that is purely commercial in context
from speech that is not. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (Court
distinguished "commercial feature" of the transactions from their informational over-
tone). Recent cases indicate the Court is now more willing to protect commercial
speech. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (corporate
speech on economic issue intimately related to the corporation's business interests is
entitled to same first amendment protection as that of individuals); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (Court noted that prospective legal client and society in
general may have strong interests in the free flow of commercial information); Vir-ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
761-63 (1976) ("purely economic" interest in pharmacist's commercial advertisement
did not disqualify him from protection under the first and fourteenth amendments).
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cause interests of both a commercial and noncommercial nature
commonly characterize solicitation efforts, such acts have received
hybrid treatment in the courts.34
Several decisions by federal courts have developed the parameters
of free speech protection for solicitation.31 In the seminal case of
Green River v. Fuller Brush Co. ,36 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a city could properly enact an ordinance prohibiting door-
to-door solicitation by salesmen.37 The express purpose of the ordi-
nance was to protect homeowners from annoyance by preventing un-
invited visitation of private residences for business purposes. 38 The
court applied the "reasonable means" test3 9 to the activity in ques-
tion, which it deemed purely commercial.4' This test, evidencing the
usual judicial deference to legislative intent, only requires that an en-
actment bear a rational or reasonable relation to the fulfillment of a
legitimate policy goal.4 The court in Green River held any first
amendment protection inapplicable in the sales context, as it did not
recognize a free speech interest in the commercial solicitation. Con-
In Bellotti, the Court asserted that regulation of corporate speech must be supported
by a compelling state interest and be the least restrictive means toward achieving the
state purpose. 435 U.S. at 776, 786. See also note 3 and accompanying text supra.
34. See notes 35-62 and accompanying text infra.
35. See, e.g., CBE v. City of Park Ridge, 567 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975) (court
attacking blanket prohibition on charitable solicitation); National Found. v. City of
Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969) (court allowing regulation of charitable solici-
tors because statutory presumption of excessive costs rebuttable).
36. 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933).
37. Id. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (Court allowed statutory
prohibition of uninvited door-to-door solicitation by sellers of commercial products
and distributors of literature; activity alleged to be a nuisance).
38. 65 F.2d at 114-15.
39. The "reasonable means" test only requires that there be a reasonable or ra-
tional connection between the means of regulation and the public end served. The
preferred character of first amendment rights dictates a more rigorous standard than
the reasonable means standard, which is applied in substantive due process and equal
protection cases where no fundamental right or suspect classification is involved. See
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
40. 65 F.2d at 115-16. The Court in Village of Schaumburg quickly disposed of
the defendant's contention that CBE was motivated primarily by interest in profit. In
addition to asserting that CBE was predominantly interested in social and political
causes, the Court said that charitable solicitation is not dealt with as a variety of
purely commercial speech because such solicitation does more than disseminate eco-
nomically beneficial information. 444 U.S. at 632.
41. See note 39 supra.
1981]
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sequently, the court did not apply the rigorous "least restrictive
means" test42 which requires that a legislative enactment infringing
free speech interests relate closely to a policy goal of compelling im-
portance.
The Supreme Court's decision in Thomas v. Collins43 showed that
advocacy would receive judicial protection even if solicitation of
funds were involved.' Plaintiff contested a state statute which pro-
hibited him from soliciting memberships in labor unions without a
permit. The Court held that the permit requirement constituted an
unlawful restraint on plaintiff's free speech interests. The opinion
emphasized that the solicitation of funds by the laborer did not alter
the constitutionally protected status of his speech.45
In National Foundation v. City of Fort Worth, 46 the Fifth Circuit
upheld an ordinance limiting the amount charitable organizations
could spend on solicitation to a certain percentage of funds col-
lected.47 Because the ordinance allowed a rebuttal of the presump-
tion of excessive solicitation costs when a charity exceeded the
percentage limit, 48 the court did not perceive an unreasonable limita-
tion on the free speech interest at issue. The court therefore held the
42. The "least restrictive means" test requires that the governmental interest pro-
moted by the regulation undergoing "strict scrutiny" be served by measures least de-
structive of the free speech interests concerned. See note 3 and accompanying text
supra; Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (legislative controls on
first amendment interests must be narrowly related to such governmental ends as pro-
tection of citizens against crime and undue annoyance).
43. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
44. The Court rejected the view that an organization espousing a lawful collective
cause could have its first amendment rights of free speech (and of free assembly)
dismissed because the organization engaged in business activities or happened to have
a leader who received compensation for exercising these rights. Id. at 53 1.
45. Id.
46. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
47. A city may reasonably require a solicitor to furnish it with a statement of the
past and expected receipts and costs of collection of the funds solicited within its
Limits. Id. at 46.
48. Although the ordinance imposed a cost cut-off, the court allowed the ordi-
nance to stand because in its opinion the cost regulation was within the city's police
power, see note 49 infra. The court premised its position on the fact that the ordi-
nance allowed for a determination of the reasonableness of the ratio between the cost
of solicitation and the amount collected when the cost of solicitation exceeded 20% of
the amount collected. Id. at 42. Contra, Village of Schaumburg v. CBE, 444 U.S.
620, 635 n.9 (1980), where the ordinance did not allow for such a determination of
reasonableness.
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ordinance to be a valid exercise of the city's power to enact legislation
protecting the safety and welfare of those within its jurisdiction.49
The Seventh Circuit condemned a blanket prohibition 0 on chari-
table solicitations in Citizensfor a Better Environment (CBE) v. City of
Park Ridge.5 The court invalidated the ordinance in spite of the
city's police power interests in safeguarding the privacy of citizens
and protecting them from fraud. 2 The principal issue in Park Ridge
was whether, in the absence of a property owner's stated desire to
keep canvassers away, the municipality could nevertheless prohibit
door-to-door solicitation of funds. 3 The court held that the city
could not constitutionally impose a blanket prohibition on nonprofit
charitable organizations that expressed essentially political ideas. 4
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. , the Supreme Court expanded the scope of protection
for solicitors.5 6 The case involved commercial advertisement of pre-
scription drugs. Contrary to precedent, the Court asserted that even
purely commercial speech merits the protection of the first amend-57
ment. Recognizing a speech interest in commercial solicitation, the
Court balanced the interests of the state in protecting citizens from
fraud and misrepresentation against the interests of the communica-
tor and recipients in a free flow of price information. 8 In applying
49. Id. Police power is the common term given to denote this inherent right of
state and local governments. For background information on the nature of the police
power, see NOWAK, supra note 11, at 389, 409-10.
50. The Supreme Court in Village of Schaumburg also condemned a blanket pro-
hibition on charitable solicitation, stating that the Village's interests could be served
by narrower means than direct prohibition. 444 U.S. at 637-38.
51. 567 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 692.
53. Id. at 691.
54. Id. at 692.
55. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
56. The Court's rationale for expanding first amendment protection was that the
interest of recipients in obtaining commercial information might exceed their interest
in political matters because commercial information has a more immediate impact on
individuals' everyday conduct. Id. at 757-58 n.15. The Court added that society in
general has an interest in the free flow of commercial information, stating that this
type of information could even spread political truth. Id. at 764-65.
57. Id. at 761.
58. Id. at 758-65. See generally Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(Court recognized the need to balance the governmental interests in protection and
domestic order against the traditions and values of free discussion and the dissemina-
tion of ideas).
1981]
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the strict scrutiny test, which proved fatal to the Virginia statute, the
Court reasoned that commercial information has value in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. 9
As noted above, solicitation is often a multipurpose enterprise. In
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizensfor a Better Environment (CBE) ,6°
the Court invalidated a city ordinance which prohibited the solicita-
tion of funds by a charitable organization whose primary purpose
was to disseminate information and advocate environmental
causes. 61 The Supreme Court held that this public, nonprofit organi-
zation was entitled to relief insofar as the ordinance purported to pro-
hibit canvassing by charities which failed to meet an arbitrary and
fixed limit on administrative expenses. 2 The Court asserted that the
ordinance unconstitutionally interfered with speech interests pro-
tected by the first and fourteenth amendments. In applying the strict
scrutiny test to the ordinance, the Court asserted that the spending
provision bore an insufficient relation to compelling governmental in-
terests63 in protecting the public from fraud," crime,65 and undue
annoyance.
66
59. 425 U.S. at 760.
60. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
61. The purpose of this type of organization is to gather and disseminate informa-
tion on public issues, using paid solicitors to help fund the organization. Id. at 635
(citing Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE) v. Village of Schaumburg, 590 F.2d
220, 225 (7th Cir. 1978)), ajt'd, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
62. The Court concluded that the 75% spending limitation unduly infringed on
the first amendment rights of both CBE and other parties not involved in this case.
Id. at 633-35. See notes I 1 and 23 supra.
63. The Court conceded that the governmental interests in protecting the public
from fraud, crime, and invasion of privacy were "substantial." 444 U.S. at 636.
64. The Court asserted that the Village's legitimate interest in preventing fraudu-
lent solicitation could be better served by "measures less intrusive than a direct prohi-
bition" on CBE's fundraising. The Court suggested penal laws and disclosure laws as
alternatives to direct prohibition. Id. at 637-38. See text accompanying note 49
supra.
65. The Court stated that it could not discern a close relationship between the
spending provision and the protection of public safety. Id. at 638. There was no
assurance, in the Court's judgment, that solicitors employed by organizations which
exceeded the spending limit could be trusted more than workers for organizations
which satisfied the limit. Id.
66. The Court asserted that the 75% requirement inadequately served the interest
in privacy because it only reduced the total number of solicitors, as would any prohi-
bition on solicitation. Moreover, the Court stated that the ordinance was not pre-
cisely drawn to serve the unique privacy interests of homeowners because it also
applied to solicitation on "public streets and public ways." Id.
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Village of Schaumburg demonstrates that a governmental entity
must satisfy the heavy burden of proving the necessity of regulatig
charitable solicitation to protect compelling governmental interests.6"
Restraints68 on a charitable organization's speech interests appear
valid only in cases where strict procedural safeguards-such as
prompt judicial determination, with the burden on the censor to es-
tablish the unprotected nature of the speech interests--exist to
counter the encroachment on first amendment rights.6 9 In Green
River, to the contrary, a reasonable connection7" between the ordi-
nance and its purported purpose satisfied judicial review. The dis-
tinction between the cases is that in Green River the salesmen's
interest was purely commercial, unlike the speech interests at issue in
Village of Schaumburg. In National Foundation v. City of Fort
Worth, the Fifth Circuit upheld a restrictive ordinance, but noted
that the organization could rebut the presumption of excessive costs
upon a proper showing.7 1 Conversely, the Supreme Court in Village
of Schaumburg emphasized the speech interests of a charitable or-
ganization in invalidating an ordinance creating an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of excessive costs.
In Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE) v. Park Ridge and in
Village of Schaumburg there were, respectively, a blanket prohibition
and an unqualified cost limitation on charitable solicitation, in both
67. Contra, National Found. v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41, 46 (5th Cir.
1969). cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970) (charitable fundraiser had burden of estab-
lishing that city ordinance did not rest on any reasonable basis).
68, Though the matter of prior restraints was only discussed indirectly by the
Court in Village of Schaumburg, it raises important constitutional issues in the First
Amendment area. See NOWAK, supra note 11, at 741-48, 844-45.
The doctrine of prior restraint is designed to subject governmental curbs on free-
dom of expression to a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality. Prior restraints
have generally been defined as those preventing information and ideas from reaching
the public. Accordingly, they have been described as the primary evil against which
the first amendment was directed. See Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12
HARv. C. R.-C. L.L. REV. 519, 519 (1977).
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the statute under review forbade
any person to solicit funds for a religious cause without having a certificate obtained
from an official who had broad discretion over whether or not to grant the certificate.
The Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional as a prior restraint upon the free
exercise of religion. Id. at 303-04. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
70. See note 39 supra.
71. See Village of Schaumburg v. CBE, 444 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) (National Foun-
dation distinguished).
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cases despite a lack of complaints of disturbance or property right
infringement by homeowners. In both cases the ordinance was inval-
idated. Thomas v. Collins is consistent with Village of Schaumburg
because in the former the right to advocate a cause, an obvious
speech interest, was upheld against the regulatory designs of the mu-
nicipality. Moreover, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, like Thomas
v. Collins, emphasized recipients' right of access to information72 and
solicitors' right to disseminate information in the commercial context.
The extension of first amendment protection to purely commercial
speech increases the onus on government to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest promoted by regulation of charitable solicitors that over-
rides solicitors' free speech interests.73
An ordinance designed to regulate charitable solicitation previ-
ously carried a presumption of reasonableness and constitutional-
ity.74 The Supreme Court's statement in Village of Schaumburg that
charitable solicitation involves more than commercial speech,7 com-
bined with the Court's holding in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
that even purely commercial speech merits first amendment protec-
tion, repudiates that presumption. The Court now seems generous in
allowing immunity for charitable organizations from severe and rigid
statutory restraints when they engage primarily in research, advo-
cacy, or public education,76 using their own paid staff to perform
72. See Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109,
109-10 (1977).
73. See Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (in re-
viewing legislation restricting dissemination of knowledge, the Court must examine
the effect of the challenged legislation and "weigh the circumstances and... ap-
praise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation..
74. See Jones, supra note 3, at 60.
75. In a recent charitable solicitation case, a state court upheld a city ordinance
which regulated charitable solicitors. Holloway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St. 2d 65, 403
N.E.2d 191 (1980). This case, however, is distinguishable in the following ways from
the factual and legal context in Village of Schaumburg: 1) The ordinance in Hollo.
way set a significantly higher limit on costs than the Village of Schaumburg ordi-
nance, and it limited such costs to the actual costs of raising funds; 2) The ordinance
in Holloway was not an outright prohibition of charitable solicitation; instead, it only
made a classification between nonaffiliated and affiliated solicitors for charities;
3) The specified percentage limitations in the Holloway ordinance could be rebutted.
403 N.E.2d at 191-92.
76. It can be surmised in the light of a succession of free speech cases culminating
with Village of Schaumburg that Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), is no
longer good law insofar as it prohibited the distribution of magazines, which are a
major source of information for the general public.
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these functions.77 This perception is consistent with the Court's his-
tory of delimiting the power of government to regulate free speech
interests.
In Village of Schaumburg the Court did not list the specific circum-
stances prerequisite to validating limits upon charitable solicitation.7 8
Furthermore, the Court's attempt to distinguish National Foundation
was not persuasive because the charitable organization there still had
to satisfy a cost percentage limitation which left discretion to munici-
pal officials. It is clear, however, that the process of first amendment
adjudication will continue to be one of "balancing" and protecting
free speech values against other societal objectives.79 In weighing the
respective interests, the Court will be wary of strict solicitation guide-
lines imposed by states upon charitable organizations.
Frank Rubin
77. But see Village of Schaumburg v. CBE, 444 U.S. at 639-45 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting with regard to broad scope of majority's position).
78. A major reason for the Court's tentativeness may have been the great number
of amiri curiae in the case. Many other charitable organizations presumably would
have sharply opposed a decision in favor of the municipality. Telephone interview
with Robert Rothschild, Attorney for Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), from
St. Louis to Chicago (Sept. 11, 1980).
Municipalities could try to circumvent the constitutional barrier that the Village of
Schaumburg encountered by asking homeowners to erect signs warning solicitors to
keep off their property. There is wording in Village of Schaumburg to the effect that
this tactic would not succeed. Specifically, the Court insisted that the decision
whether to contribute to certain charitable organizations should be left to individual
choice. 444 U.S. at 638. A reasonable inference would be that the Court would not
support this kind of municipal influence, given the Court's broad protection of free-
dom of speech.
79. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 51-55 (1962); BeVier, supra
note 2, at 347.
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